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In recent years, the phenomenon of nationalism has evoked much attention when negotiating 
the institutional design of India’s universities. Justifiably rejecting the political project of 
naturalizing or essentializing the concepts of nation and nationhood, critical public and 
scientific discourse, however, often reduces nationalism to its symbolic or idealistic 
dimension. On the contrary, material structures of public institutional spaces have received 
little geographical attention when approaching national ideals, aspirations, conflicts, and 
controversies. This is despite the fact that constructed environments and spatial designs 
form a substantial link between the nation state of India and its public higher education 
institutions.  
Arguing that space makes a difference, the paper in hand raises nationalism as a problem of 
simultaneous positioning. By tracking India’s higher education development through the 
example of Jawaharlal Nehru University campus space, I will not only focus on nationalism 
as a matter of symbol and categories of consciousness but also on the material dimensions 
of institutional design, namely building distribution, constructional aesthetics, and spatial 
accessibility. Thus, this work offers perspectives that extend beyond the idealization or 
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1 Where is Jawaharlal Nehru University? An introductory question 
 
In July 2016, I jumped off bus no. 511 at Ber Sarai Bus Stop, South Delhi. Disoriented, I 
turned back to the bus driver: “Where is Jawaharlal Nehru University?”. The driver’s 
response was unsettling: “You want to go to JNU? Go to Pakistan!” Pakistan? Was I not looking 
for one of the most popular and best performing universities of India? 
 
It was on 9th of February 2016, at the very place of Jawaharlal Nehru University Campus, 
located in South Delhi, India, that during an event organized by a left-wing student 
organisation a number of people, masked and thus unidentified, were heard sloganeering: 
Bharat ki barbadi tak jung rahegi (We keep fighting our battle until India is destroyed). 
Informed by upset members of the right-wing student party Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi 
Parishad (ABVP)1, the university’s Vice Chancellor (VC) called the police by way of exception. 
The police forcefully ended the event, and arrested the then-incumbent JNU-Students’ 
Union (JNUSU) President Kanhaiya Kumar along with two other students. The students were 
taken to jail and charged with sedition, which provoked nationwide anger. The 9th of Feb 
incidence rapidly became media-effective. While on live television, India’s most watched 
anchor, Arnab Goswami, shouted at invited JNU students: “If you’re not anti-national, why 
is the Indian state an enemy in your protest and Pakistan is not? Which side are you on?” 
(Goswami, 2016). The opinion that JNU is placed on the enemy’s side – that it should go to 
Pakistan!2 – eventually mobilized an India-wide witch-hunt campaign against the entire 
Jawaharlal Nehru University. Convinced of JNU’s anti-national character, Delhi’s rickshaw 
drivers and shop keepers stopped servicing JNU members, posters propagated their lynching 
in the capital’s streets, JNU alumni received notice that their work- or tenancy agreements 
were terminated for holding a degree issued by the institution of “terrorism and treason” 
(FPJ Bureau, 2016), and parliamentarians called for the university’s closure: 
JNU has a long history of sedition and anti-national politics and it is not easy to combat it 
intellectually or through campus politics […]. So the best way is to vacate the hostels and 
shut the university down. It can be restarted in a different way, with a different curriculum, 
a different set of students, and a different administration (Chandan Mitra as cited in Sarkar 
& Swamy 2016). 
How could Jawaharlal Nehru University, established as the Indian nation’s academic flagship 
project – truly national – and ever since having stood out with its successful alumni – 
academics, intellectuals, civil servants, diplomats, and politicians3 – lose its standing and 
integration within the Indian nation? 
                                                          
1 The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) is a student organisation affiliated to the Hindu 
nationalist association of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Its political activities are also close to 
the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, the official youth wing of the governing Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP). 
2 ‘Go to Pakistan!’ has become a proverb expressing ‘You have no business here’ or ‘Go to hell’.  
3 In fact, today, a large number of ministers from the Modi cabinet are JNU graduates. Most 
prominently the foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, the commerce minister Nirmala 
Sitharaman, as well as Amitabh Kant, who is said to be the force behind the Prime Minister's Make in 
India campaign.  
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The following makes the question for JNU’s national exclusion a question of positioning. I 
argue that the public university’s disparagement – its normative displacement on the 
enemy’s side – extends far beyond the singular incident of 9 February 2016. Institutionally 
built upon the administrative intersection of the Indian government and the academic 
community, JNU is caught between two sides that are gradually drifting apart in ideological 
terms. The university has become a contested space, where two potentially powerful actors 
measure the forces of state authority and academic autonomy against each other. The 9th of 
Feb incidence is thus only one “political spectacle” (D’Arcus 2006, 6) in a broader trial of 
strength and larger political negotiations, in which the two sides battle over the prerogative 
of interpreting nothing less than the nation itself. By methodologically asking ‘Where is 
JNU?’, I have approached those negotiations from the perspective of campus space. 
Following JNU’s institutional and constructional history, I will not only focus on the symbolic 
dimension of nationhood, the nation, and nationalism but also on the material dimensions 
of the concepts, namely building distribution, constructional aesthetics, and spatial 
accessibility. This work understands itself as an edited collection of data provided by JNU-
members and persons affected or involved in the JNU controversy. It is structured in the 
following way:  
Chapter 2 provides basic information on the JNU Campus and embeds the central university 
within its larger institutional setting, i.e. the Indian higher education sector. Pointing to the 
interlinkages between physical campus structures and institutional policymaking, I will 
deepen the understanding for my chosen theoretical perspective and enlarge upon the 
applied empirical methods. That will provide the ground for the following three chapters. 
Chapter 3, 4, and 5 each take a closer look at the functional divisions found on JNU Campus, 
thereby tracking the changes that characterize India’s higher education development. 
Chapter 3 will scrutinize JNU’s residential units. Here, in relation with the institutional 
undertaking of demographic recategorization, the campus’s constructional patterns have 
decisively changed over the past two decades. The interrelating effects of physical 
structures and demographic identity will be discussed against their historical background 
and their impact on the understanding of Indian nationhood. The following chapter will then 
turn to JNU’s Academic Block. Chapter 4 investigates on the effects of economic and 
politico-ideological reorientations in India’s knowledge production. Looking at the 
constructional alignment of learning environments and aesthetics will stress the significant 
role of historiography and historical knowledge production for the diverging forms of Indian 
nationalisms that are under negotiation on campuses all over India. Chapter 5 will examine 
the aspect of spatial accessibility as a key factor for political and administrative 
participation. Tracking the diversification of political movements and the changing spatiality 
of JNU’s Administration Block, I will describe the various angles from which the university 
can be viewed in its relation to an outside: the Indian government and the broader society. 
Based on the information presented in the previous chapters, I will combine the findings in 
chapter 6. Subsuming the data under the notions of nation as their common reference point 
will allow drawing conclusions. Thus, the final chapter will provide the possibilities of 
localizing Jawaharlal Nehru University within the Indian nation and give differentiated 
answers to the introductory question: Where is JNU? 
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In its entirety, this work serves a triple purpose. Firstly, bringing together official documents 
and the contemporary witnesses’ knowledge about JNU’s construction history, it is a current 
documentary, a snapshot, so to speak, of Jawaharlal Nehru University campus space. 
Secondly, this paper wants to contribute to the continuing discourse on the political and 
societal role, as well as the responsibility of University as a national institution. Relying on 
my empirical data, I aim to concretize the very terms of institution and nation, thus making 
them more approachable for further empirical research. Thirdly, this work methodologically 
joins in a debate on how space makes a difference (cf. i.a. Massey 2005, McGregor 2004, 
Sayer 1985, Shortell and Brown 2014, Soja 1996). The example of Jawaharlal Nehru 
University will highlight how constructed environments and institutional settings in their 
relatedness are socio-political, and hence spatial constructions, rather than immutable 
facts. 
 
2 How Jawaharlal Nehru University makes a difference: The campus within 
India’s landscape of higher education 
 
This work is based on the critical idea that space makes a difference: Public environments 
always produce and reproduce wider society’s norms, forms, images, and imaginings of 
geography (McGregor 2004, 2; Said 1994, 7). Therefore, the perceptibility of spatial designs 
forms a substantial link between the nation state of India and its public institutions of higher 
education. To gain further insights and additional perspectives on the role of national visions 
for India’s institutional design, geographical research on built environments becomes 
crucial. Before I will turn to a more detailed description of JNU Campus, this chapter has 
the purpose of preparing the ground. It provides introductory information on Jawaharlal 
Nehru University in its institutional and spatial set up. As one of India’s 47 central universities 
the campus must also be understood against the backdrop of its larger institutional 
framework that is India’s higher education landscape. Therefore, the subsequent section will 
provide an overview about India’s higher education development. Taking both sets of 
information into account, I will then enlarge upon my theoretical perspective and applied 
research method.  
 
2.1 Setting up JNU as truly national university 
 
Years before the actual campus constructions would even start, Jawaharlal Nehru University 
was already envisioned to become an institutional milestone in independent India’s 
landscape of higher education. In the early 1960s, the idea to establish a new university – a 
university that would be “different from all other universities in India and therefore be 
unique in itself” (Education Minister (1969–71) V.K.R.V. Rao as cited in Batabyal 2014, 27) – 
was born out of necessity. One and a half decades after the Republic’s founding, India’s 
higher education system was facing a major crisis of institutional design. Developed as 
instruments of colonial governance, the bulk of universities had turned into battlegrounds 
during Independence and Partition struggles. On campuses all over India, most prominently 
in Banaras Hindu University and Aligarh Muslim University, claims for political power were 
fought out along the lines of religion, caste, and language. Consequently, universities’ 
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societal benefit was viewed sceptically by politicians and public. Despite many critics, 
India’s first Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru insisted on the importance of universities 
as the independent nation’s main building blocks (Roy 2007, 105ff.). Under PM Nehru’s 
leadership, the Congress government asserted that modernity, progress, and economic 
development, along with democracy and territorial cohesion could only be achieved by 
educating the coming generations of India’s citizens in “truly national universities” 
(Education Minister (1969–71) V.K.R.V. Rao as cited in Batabyal 2014, 27). In December 1964, 
the Jawaharlal Nehru University Bill was presented to the Rajya Sabha, the Upper House of 
the Indian parliament. It was read as an anti-colonial counter proposal and as such welcomed 
not only by the Congress, but also by the Communist Party of India: 
Let us not have Cambridges and Oxfords and Princetons and Harvards here; […] let us create 
universities and colleges that our people need, that our development needs, for the re-
making of our material and cultural being […], for the sons of the working people, the 
workers, the peasants and the middle classes (Bhupesh Gupta from the Communist Party of 
India as cited in Batabyal 2014, 8). 
Interpreted against the contemporary understanding of the Indian constitution, the public 
institution was thought to be built on an intersection point. On campus, two potentially 
powerful actors – the Indian government and the academic community – should meet and 
recreate a harmonious relationship between the Indian state and its citizens. Therefore, the 
JNU was conceptualized as a central university and thus fell under the jurisdiction of the 
Union Government. The Centre would provide the university’s funding and appoint the Vice 
Chancellor (VC) of the institution. At the same time, JNU was granted an unprecedented 
degree of autonomy. It was entitled to make its own statutes regarding “admission policy, 
framing of courses, methods of teaching, and technique of evaluation of students” (Bhambhri 
1996, 87). The idea that a university should not be a “department of the state” (Education 
Minister (1963-1966) M. C. Chagla as cited in Kidwai 2017) rooted in the founders’ attraction 
to the European ideal of academic autonomy, which was valued as an elementary democratic 
principle. Simultaneously, the liberal philosophy of academic autonomy was understood as 
genuinely Indian and, primarily, post-colonial as it opposed British utilitarianism (Bose 2017, 
160). Bearing former PM Jawaharlal Nehru’s name, the new university was to play a socially 
transformative role and represent the three basic principles of national integration, 
socialism, and universalism.  
When Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India, the debate around the new 
institution gathered momentum and became concrete. After the Jawaharlal Nehru University 
Bill was eventually passed in 1966, education minister Nurul Hasan assigned the first teaching 
positions. PM Indira Gandhi herself appointed Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, India’s former 
Ambassador to the United Nations, as JNU’s first Vice Chancellor. Jawaharlal Nehru 
University commenced its research and teaching activities in 1971 at a site that is today 
known as the JNU Old Campus.4  
                                                          




The site was previously developed as a training ground for civil servants and already offered 
adequate infrastructure to the first university members: 
 
From the beginning, the atmosphere was actually very liberal. Everyone lived on campus. 
Since we all lived close and ate together, it was not so difficult to get work done by the 
officers. It was easy to relate to them. There was also a very interesting process of gender 
socialisation. There were a lot of young women students. Within the campus, it was safe, so 
even in the late night students could hang around chatting (Alumni (m), personal 
communication, June 17, 2017). 
It was that special JNU atmosphere, hitherto unknown in formal institutional spaces, that 
attracted liberal and ideologically left-leaning visitors – intellectuals, politicians, and artists 
from all over India. On campus, extra-curricular talks, film screenings, and political debates 
became an integral part of the JNU culture. To translate that liberal atmosphere into the 
language of architecture and town planning became the overall objective of spatial planning 
on JNU’s ‘new’ campus (Campus Committee of the Jawaharlal Nehru University [CCJNU] 
n.d.). 
The JNU Campus construction commenced in 1970 with the Delhi Development Authority 
(DDA) granting 1019 acres of land to the university. By the end of 1989, the campus was fully 
functional. Whereas JNU is now located in the buzzing heart of South Delhi, during its initial 
construction phase, the area was barely connected to the capital’s urban infrastructure. As 
part of the Delhi Mehrauli Ridge, a northern extension of the Aravalli Range, the land was 
rocky and barren. JNU’s development has sustainably changed the environment. To make 
life on campus more comfortable and protect residents from the harsh semi-arid climate, 
the entire campus area was afforested (Fig. 1). Today, it comprises 369 acres of green area 
and 200 acres of protected forest (Jawaharlal Nehru University Engineer Branch 2015). Thus, 
it is assigned by the DDA (2010) as recreational land, falling under public and semi-public 
land use. With regard to construction patterns, i.e. building speed and -quantity, spatial 
arrangement, and architectural style, the campus development can be divided into two 
construction phases, one before and one following the 1990s. The first phase of campus 
development was characterized by the gradual erection of residential units in the north-
western and south-eastern areas. Simultaneously, in the centre of the campus, an academic 
complex, initially comprising seven schools, and the Administration Block were developed. 
The second phase of campus development showed more rapid constructional growth and 
focussed on large-scale expansion towards the campus’s southwest boundary. Furthermore, 
new schools were built in the Academic Block’s fringes, road infrastructure was enhanced, 
and beautification measures adopted in the 1990s shaped the campus appearance decisively. 
In 2017, several construction sites indicate the erection of new hostels and academic 
buildings in the near future. Over the past decades, due to Delhi’s growth, JNU has become 
an integral part of the capital’s urban landscape. Framed by three main thoroughfares, the 
campus lies amidst the residential areas of Munirka Village and Vasant Kunj. Along its eastern 
boundary, the campus abuts Qutab Institutional Area and the Indian Institute of Technology. 
In the 1980s, 157 acres of JNU’s campus land was allotted to other educational institutions 
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(Fig.1). Hence Jawaharlal Nehru University became an integral part of a larger educational 
complex. The university’s constructional developments must also be viewed against the 




2.2 The institutional landscape of India’s higher education 
 
Since JNU’s official inauguration in 1969, the Republic’s higher education system has been 
formally shaped by three major factors: governmental education policy (‘standardization’), 
vacillating programmes of affirmative action (‘democratization’), and the process of 
economic reorientation (‘liberalization’). According to Agarwal (2007, 198), India’s post-
independence development of higher education took place in two distinct phases: one before 
1980 and one following the 1980s. 
The country’s first independent education policy was launched in 1968 with the Congress 
government implementing the National Policy on Education (NPE). The NPE wanted to reform 
the hitherto institutional structures that were established under colonial rule and 
consequently were regarded as undesired colonial heritage. The second NPE was introduced 
in 1986, and partly revised in 1992. It adjusted higher education to India’s changing economic 
and political scene. Both National Policies on Education, that of 1968 and that of 1986/1992, 
Fig. 1: JNU campus map 
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resembled each other insofar as they defined education as an agent to promote “the goals 
of ‘socialism’, ‘secularism’ and ‘democracy’” (Sharma 2016, 142). 
Altering programmes of affirmative action also brought substantial changes in India’s higher 
education system. Already since the 1950s, compensatory discrimination and reservation 
quotas were continuously enhanced to foster nationwide democratization. In 1979, the 
Morarji Desai government (Janata Party) mandated the so-called Mandal Commission. The 
commission’s recommendations were eventually implemented in 1990, after which the 
government decreed a nationwide reservation quota that not only considered members of 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), but also citizens that were henceforth 
categorized as belonging to Other Backward Classes (OBC).5 The quota aimed to democratize 
Indian institutions of higher education by granting university seats to students from “the 
‘weaker sections’ of the society” (Desai & Kulkarni 2008, 249). What was controversially 
referred to as mandalisation of institutions, changed the outlook of India’s campuses. It led 
to an overall expansion of higher education and transformed the awareness for 
differentiability amongst university members. In fact, it lastingly changed the perception of 
diversity. The Mandal Commission, which was established to “determine the criteria for 
defining the socially and educationally backward classes” (Government of India 1980, iii), 
had not only assessed the criteria of regional origin and class as indicators for social 
deprivation, but had also referred to the aspects of religion and – most significantly – caste. 
The demographic recategorization hit a political and public arena, where the notion of caste 
was considered “something from the past” (Menon & Nigam 2007, 15) and was a term equally 
rejected by the Hindu right-wing and the Nehruvian modernists. Reviving the very term of 
caste for reasons of democratization and bringing it back to public discourse, eventually 
displayed the “erosion of the Nehruvian secular-nationalist imagination” (ibid., 15). 
Besides the NPEs and the enhanced affirmative action policies, the third factor that 
sustainably impacted the institutional landscape of higher education was India’s economic 
reorientation, also referred to as liberalization. Until the 1980s, India’s higher education 
sector was heavily nationalized. Even though the protectionist state had been reliant on 
private actors to establish and develop institutions of higher education, it had authorised 
private intervention only in form of grant-in-aid institutions (Agarwal 2007, 199). However, 
following the 1980s, India’s higher education sector entered a new phase that heralded 
contrasting developments. Gradually the state disengaged from its responsibilities by 
handing them over to private actors, who in return for their services demanded more 
entrepreneurial autonomy from the state. India’s economic liberalization in 1991 fostered 
that trend. In resonance with the national and international6 directives that called higher 
education to face its “long-standing problems and the new realities” (World Bank 2000, 9), 
Indian institutions of higher education were encouraged to adopt market-relevant policies. 
                                                          
5 Schedule Castes (SC), Schedule Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC) are demographic 
categories that are given reservation status and positive discrimination by the Indian Constitution. 




In turn, public budgets for 
education were withdrawn. The 
increasing self-financing of higher 
education, along with a 
substantial rise in student 
numbers, changed the academic 
landscape at the beginning of the 
1990s. For the past 20 years, 
private universities flourish while 
the public sector stagnates (Fig. 
2). The growing significance of 
commercially interested private 
actors is also traceable in the 
Indian jurisdiction. In 1992, the 
Indian Supreme Court had judged 
that making education 
“commerce […] is opposed to the 
ethos, tradition and sense of nation” (Kapur & Mehta 2007, 30). In 2005, however, it clearly 
revised its judgement. Then the Supreme Court favoured private property rights over 
governmental regulation by stating that in the face of “the inability or unwillingness of 
government to provide the necessary support”, institutions which do not take state aid, 
“should have the maximum freedom possible” (ibid., 33, 36). The granted freedom primarily 
refers to the admission policy of private institutions and effectively exempts them from 
meeting reservation quotas (ibid., 35). Not all private actors, who emerged after 1991, were 
driven by exclusively economic motives. The member associations of the Sangh Parivar7, for 
example, started to engage heavily in the education sector and primarily demanded the 
politico-ideological reorientation of India’s education system. In the spirit of Hindutva8, they 
stress the need for “nationalising and spiritualising” (Iype 1998) Indian curricular. Over the 
past two decades, ideological and financial gaps grew between private and public 
universities because of the ‘hindutvaisation’ of private education and establishing 
affirmative action a matter of public institutions exclusively. 
For this reason, the Modi government, incumbent since 2014, has set itself the task to reduce 
institutional imbalances by fostering higher education’s standardization. Presently (status 
2017) concerned with developing an educational reform “closer to current realities” (Sharma 
2016, 143), the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) has announced India’s 
imminent third education policy. With its New Educational Policy (NEP), the government 
promises nothing less than making “India a knowledge superpower” (Ministry of Human 
Resource Development [MHRD] 2015a). According to Madhulika Sharma, who evaluated the 
policy draft in 2016, the NEP is closely linked with PM Modi’s wider understanding of 
governance. Thus, it is partly based on the endeavour to enhance the marketability of 
education and “the narration of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) spirit of Hindutva” 
                                                          
7 The name Sangh Parivar (‘Family of Organisations’) covers several independently run organisations 
that represent the Hindu nationalist movement, i.a. the RSS. 
8 Hindutva refers to a political concept of Hindu nationalism. 
 





(Sharma 2016, 141). To that effect, the NEP will significantly deviate from the preceding 
NPEs, especially with regard to the definitions of economic orientation and governmental 
responsibility. The NEP intends to enhance the “participation of SC, ST and Minority groups” 
by linking higher education to “employability”, “internationalization”, and a “meaningful 
partnership with the private sector” (MHRD 2015b, 29, 49, 54, 2). PM Modi, “the first 
genuinely post-socialist political leader of India” (Schöttli & Pauli 2016, 157), focuses on 
increasing efficiency of higher education by uncoupling the idea of inclusive higher education 
from its hitherto welfare approach. Consequently, the economic developments devised since 
India’s economic liberalization in 1991 were strongly promoted. The NEP becomes the 
serious economic and politico-ideological effort for the restructuring of the education 
system, and thus it will support the larger economic and social reforms envisaged for India 
by the BJP government (Sharma 2016, 142-143). 
Although the NEP has not been officially implemented yet, its paradigms already manifest 
on India’s campus spaces. By bypassing the established regulatory mechanisms of the 
institutions frequently and autocratically9, new administrative functions and procedures 
have been put into practice at many public universities throughout India. Those institutional 
amendments target the three structural pillars of public universities, namely campus 
demographics, the orientation of knowledge production, and the allocation of administrative 
power. 
 
2.3 How looking at university space makes a difference: Theoretical framework 
and methodical approach 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru University was conceptualized as a truly national university. Hence, it is 
translating a historically and politically distinct vision of nation into campus design, which 
has turned the concept of nation into the basis for legitimacy of the institution and made 
Indianness its enduring benchmark. Nevertheless, over the past four and a half decades the 
concepts of the Indian nation and its public institutional setting have altered with respect 
to demographic categorization, orientation of knowledge production, and allocation of 
administrative power. How did these changes correlate with the spatiality of Jawaharlal 
Nehru University? 
In recent years, various concepts of nationhood and especially the phenomenon of 
nationalism have evoked much attention by public literature and various scientific 
disciplines. Justifiably rejecting the political project of naturalizing or essentializing the 
nation, critical public and scientific discourse on nationalism, however, often reduces 
nationalism to its symbolic dimension. Thus, the concepts of nation, nationalism, and 
nationhood are looked upon as political propaganda, jingoism, or exclusively as categories 
of cultural consciousness (Jaffrelot 2003, 11ff.). On the contrary, material structures of 
public institutional spaces have received little attention when approaching the phenomenon 
of nationalism. That makes further scientific investigation insightful and crucial. 
Consequently, the text in hand seeks to understand national “inclusion/exclusion as a 
problem of simultaneous positioning, focusing not only on the symbolic dimension of the 
                                                          
9 cf. i.a. Ved 2011; Bhattacharya 2016, 2; Kumar 2016, 30
10 
 
world but also on the material dimension” (Löw 2008, 26). Material space and nationalism 
were simultaneously chosen for two reasons: Firstly, in an institutional setting, profound 
changes are always comparatively tenacious. The construction of environments takes time. 
Physical environments require extensive planning; they need to be constructed and 
constructionally maintained. Secondly, constructed environments are the very abodes of 
everyday life, which makes them immediately perceptible and negotiable. Observation is 
not enough for serious research; it requires to “verbally express the constitution of spaces, 
reconsider it, discuss it, and exercise a monitoring influence on it” (ibid., 37). In short, the 
various notions of the nation in their material expressions are scientifically approachable by 
qualitative methods. Following Martina Löw’s (2008) understanding of duality of space, I 
have examined JNU Campus as the product of “social action which at the same time has 
structuring power” (Löw 2008, 33). Thinking of location as a relational specification, I have 
empirically approached the campus methodologically by asking ‘Where is JNU?’. By tracing 
the campus’s past and present constructional arrangement and land use, I want to provide 
insights into both, the historically grown physical structures, and the various ideologically 
shaped interpretations of its spatiality. The empirical data presented in this paper was 
collected during my stays on JNU Campus between July and December 2016, and in April 
2017. In my everyday interactions on campus, I gained first guiding information. To gain 
further insights into JNU’s physical arrangements that navigate “quotidian movements” 
(Shortell & Brown 2014), and into the lived environment that produces specific localities, I 
was kindly taken for walks around the campus by present and former university members. 
Those tours were recorded in jointly created maps (50 records). Collected spatial 
information was grounded and contextualized in semi-structured interviews. The 
interlocutors consulted were subject matter experts, i.e. student and faculty 
representatives (22 and 12 records), activists articulating divergent political opinions (26 
records), officials providing constructional information (4 records), and contemporary 
witnesses sharing their memory of past JNU (15 records). Meetings took place in face-to-
face settings or in group discussions. Most conversations were held in English. In case 
interlocutors preferred another language, it was interpreted to me by attendants. With 
permission of the speakers, conversations were recorded. Accordingly, quotes found in this 
work are word-for-word interview transcriptions.10 
By combining two streams of literature, the analysis of data unveils a connection heretofore 
neglected: public university and space. I took up ideas from cultural geography, critical 
geography, and sociology of space (i.a. D’Arcus 2006; Deshpande 1995; Löw 2008; Massey 
2005; Shortell and Brown 2014). Those theoretical approaches were combined with 
information from contemporary publications on India’s higher education system and 
institutional change (i.a. Agarwal 2007; Kapur & Mehta 2007; Kumar 2016; Sharma 2016). In 
the comparative process of data analysis, I have derived three spatially approachable 
categories, namely that of building distribution, constructional aesthetics, and spatial 
accessibility. Every category was interlinked to the three factors defining the institutional 
set-up, namely demographic categorization, orientation of knowledge production, and 
administrative power allocation. Addressing nationalism as a relational phenomenon, the 
                                                          
10 Adoption of statements or expressions commonly used on campus are italicized. 
11 
 
following three chapters provide detailed information on the constructional and institutional 
history of the public institutional space, Jawaharlal Nehru University Campus. 
 
3 Where is JNU living? Spatial distribution and campus demographics in the 
residential units 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru University is a residential campus. Spread over four units – Uttarakhand, 
Dakshinapuram, Pashimabad, and Poorvanchal – JNU Campus provides large housing areas, 
cultural sites, a sports stadium, shopping complexes, and canteens that cater for the 
everyday needs of students, faculty members, and karmacharis (non-academic employees) 
permanently residing on campus.11 When compared to other metropolitan public 
universities, JNU accommodates a small university community comprising around 8400 
students in 2016 (Jawaharlal Nehru University 2016, 2-3). However, over the past three 
decades, the number of students has quadrupled and the constantly growing number of 
campus inhabitants has altered the campus’s constructional topography in more than one 
way. The demographic and constructional transformations of the campus must be viewed 
against the backdrop of nation-wide institutional changes. These modifications emerged in 
the mid-1980s and took shape in the 1990s. Then two partly contradictory developments 
affected India’s higher education sector. On the one hand, beginning in the mid-1980s, the 
Indian state gradually disengaged from its educational responsibilities, which led to the 
withdrawal of public budget for education. It intensified the resource crises at public 
institutions throughout India. On the other hand, with the intention to democratize India’s 
public institutions, the government extended the national affirmative-action policy. Not only 
did that lead to an overall increased student enrolment, the demographics of the campus 
were also affected and the perception of differentiability among Indian university members 
was lastingly transformed. Both developments, though at first glance seemingly unrelated, 
showed their reciprocal effects on JNU campus space. At that point, the spatial planning 
faced not one but two main challenges. Firstly, JNU, though already suffering from severe 
lack of funds, had to accommodate a constantly growing number of students. Secondly, the 
burning question was: which kind of spatial arrangement would do justice to the increasingly 
perceived social and economic differences of students?  
In view of these two challenges, this chapter investigates the ideological answers provided 
and spatial solutions determined. By more closely examining JNU’s western residential units, 
section 3.1 and section 3.2 will track the distinct constructional patterns that have emerged 
on campus before and following the 1990s. The subsequent section will discuss the empirical 
findings in their comparison. 
 
                                                          
11 In 2016, two thirds of the students enrolled in JNU were accommodated in 18 hostels: 8 hostels are 
reserved for men, 5 for women students. Four hostels comprise both a women’s and a men’s wing. 
One complex accommodates married students and their families. In 2017, the basic room rent for two 
semesters was between 90 to 240 INR. 
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3.1 At JNU’s constructional origin 
 
Within a few walking minutes behind the main gate, having passed famous Ganga Dhaba and 
the Kamal Shopping Complex (Fig. 3, no. 18 & 19), then taking a sharp left, one stands amidst 
Periyar, Kaveri, and Godavari student hostel (Fig. 3, no. 4, 5 & 6). The three buildings belong 
to the first set of constructed hostels on campus, which are shaped like pyramids, designed 
by the architectural office Kukreja as “places where one finds rest” (Former Student of 
Moonis Raza (m), personal communication, April 17, 2017). The bright red bricks of the 
hostels and the architectural recognition factor of the campus were used to represent JNU’s 
“indigenous modernism” (CP Kukreja Architects 2017). While Periyar and Kaveri offer 
differently sized and angled rooms to male students, Godavari hostel is reserved for women. 
The three hostels stand in close proximity to each other and are arranged around an open 
square named after the South Indian mountain range Nilgiri Dhaba (Fig. 3, no. 21). The dhaba 
(food stall/roadside restaurant) is the heart of Dakshinapuram campus unit. With its three 
student hostels encircled by faculty residences, its State Bank of India branch, a bicycle and 
a shoe repair shop opposite several road stalls, Dakshinapuram campus area forms an 
assemblage. Herein lies JNU’s constructional origin. Following the spatial arrangement of 
the unit, the asphalted streets sneaking up the hill, or one of the numerous well-trodden 








When in 1970 1,019 acres of land had been granted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University, a 
Campus Committee, chaired by the Vice Chancellor G. Parthasarathi, formulated a 
Document for the Design of the Master Plan of the University Campus. The document details 
how the Nehruvian principles of national integration, democratic way of life, and scientific 
socialism should be cultivated in JNU’s residential space. In each campus unit “students and 
teachers coming from different parts of India […], professing diverse faiths, studying and 
researching in different fields [should] live together” (CCJNU n.d.). JNU’s first rector, the 
geographer Moonis Raza, is said to have been the mastermind behind JNU’s spatial planning. 
He suggested that the “spirit of democracy and social justice” (ibid.) should spread in the 
campus within four residential units. These units, named after geographical regions – 
Dakshinapuram in the south, Uttarakhand in the north, Paschimabad in the west, and 
Poorvanchal in the east – are a tribute to the vastness of the Indian nation’s territory until 
today. As distinguished from other Indian universities, where residential areas of students 
and faculty members are clearly separated from each other, it was the objective of the JNU 
Master Plan to break with those segregating structures. To further stand out from the bulk 
of Indian universities “where Malayali students live in the Kerala House, Bihar students in 
the Bihar House and so on” (ibid.), all JNU students, originating from different cultural, 
linguistic, and religious backgrounds, should be accommodated together. “The experiment 
of putting together in adjacent rooms a Life Sciences undergraduate from Tamilnad with a 
History post-graduate from the Punjab and a researcher in Musicology from Assam” was seen 
as “full of exciting possibilities” (ibid.). Stress was laid on the creation of walkability and 
the provision of space for interpersonal encounter. Each walk through the campus should be 
“an opportunity to get glimpses of the diversity of India” (ibid.). Consequently, all four units 
were linked “by arteries of communication – roads, footpaths, and tracks through 
shrubberies. […] The informal chat […] during an evening walk along a common promenade 
or over a cup of tea in a common cafeteria” (ibid.) should foster teacher-students contacts 
and ensure that the learning environment is not limited to formal classroom situations. The 
JNU spatial planners’ overall objective was to construct an assemblage in which places were 
not individually assigned to a single function, but instead would offer various possibilities of 
activity to all JNU members. 
In July 1972, the first students moved from the Old Campus to the new campus site. Similar 
to the Old Campus space, Nilgiri Dhaba soon became a popular meeting spot. The building 
at its centre included a television room, a table tennis room, a chess room, and a reading 
room offering a selection of Indian and international magazines. As envisaged by the JNU 
Master Plan, access to the place was not restricted by the time of day or by professional 
status or university affiliation. Students, teachers and their families, as well as interested 
guests met at Nilgiri Dhaba after the classes. A 1970s Kaveri hostel resident recalls the spatial 
proximity  
gave a very different kind of relationship, at the social level, at the emotional level, and 
much more important at the level of learning. I remember my teacher; one time he was in 
the middle of the night correcting my paper. He just walked up to my room and said: ‘What 
is that? I can't sleep because you write things I can't make out.’ […]. JNU was the one place 
where teachers were always accessible. It was the one place where you can access any kind 
14 
 
of an idea. And you can question your teachers in the class as well as outside (Alumni (m), 
personal communication, April 17, 2017). 
Nonetheless, the new institution was not met with unanimous advocacy. The Hindu right 
wing firmly doubted the societal benefit of the liberal morals propagated on JNU Campus 
and criticized the construction works for being too expensive. At the same time, upset voices 
raised from within the student body: 
The University has spent Rs 49 lakhs for constructing 72 houses for teachers and Rs 61 lakhs 
for 600 hostel rooms for students and warden's flats. Another 10 lakh is estimated to be 
spent on development and beautification of this area. Buying airconditioners [sic], carpets, 
and expensive furniture come first in the priority list of our planners, while the hostels for 
students and quarters for Class III and IV employees are yet to be ready (Koshy 1973, 48). 
Indeed, the gap between the vision of the JNU Master Plan (Fig. 4) and the material realities 
found on campus would widen in following decades. In the early 1970s, and under the 
patronage of the Congress, the institution is said to have been “positively affected by the 
liberal outlook of Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s government towards JNU. […] There were no 
restrictions. Funding was available for expanding. The campus was built. Then her [Indira 
Gandhi’s] politics changed” (Alumni (m), personal communication, June 17, 2017). 
 
Fig. 4: The JNU Master Plan: JNU Campus as envisioned by the architect Kukreja and the 
Campus Committee in the early 1970s 
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In June 1975, PM Indira Gandhi declared an internal emergency. Issuing laws by decree, PM 
Gandhi’s policy violently opposed her opponents in politics, media, economy, and academia. 
The government violated JNU’s granted autonomy and sent police forces to campus, picking 
up “students randomly from the hostels and taking them to the local police station. They 
locked hostel rooms and students found themselves without shelter. That changed JNU’s 
perspective on the government” (Alumni (m), personal communication, April 22, 2017). 
Forced by massive JNU student protest, Indira Gandhi had to resign from her post as JNU’s 
Chancellor in 1977. Although the campus construction sites were not entirely stopped during 
the Emergency, constructional discrepancies regarding the original master plan occurred in 
the immediate aftermath. When Indira Gandhi lost the election against Morarji Desai from 
the Janata Party in 1977, the national budget was amended, and funding previously intended 
for the further construction of JNU was cut. In the first instance, shortage of money resulted 
in housing shortage. The research and teaching activities of JNU had been conducted for six 
years, new schools had been opened, and especially the introduction of the master 
programmes had increased the number of student admissions. Consequently, the rising 
number of campus inhabitants became inversely proportional to the slowed-down 
construction works. Accommodation space had become a limited resource. In Kaveri hostel, 
July 1977 is remembered as the month when all hostel rooms, which were originally 
conceptualized for single occupancy – so was the sanitary infrastructure and the allocation 
of water resources – became double assigned. In the opinion of former Kaveri hostel 
residents, the double occupancy prefigured the so-called hostel crisis. Until today, 
accommodation shortage remains among the most serious issues on campus. It caused the 
major deviations from the original master plan after the 1970s and challenged the original 
ideal of JNU to create a space for diversity on a common campus. According to the national 
vision of the institution, highly subsidised accommodation had been an integral part: JNU 
aspired to an outstanding pan-Indian character. A quota, anchored in the admission policy, 
should ensure that students and teaching personnel from all parts of India were recruited. 
To foster the JNU community’s unity, all members, regardless of whether they could afford 
accommodation off-campus in Delhi’s high-rent environment, lived within the campus space. 
However, with the university losing the 
capacity to provide rooms, JNU’s 
founding vision proved infeasible. In 
other words, under the rising pressure of 
resource scarcity, the ideal of diversity – 
equally allocating resources to students 
of different regional origin, culinary 
preference, and native language – could 
no longer conceal the students’ different 
socio-economic situation. The hostel 
crisis intensified during the 1990s, after 
the implementation of the Mandal 
Commission Recommendations. The 
introduction of the OBC reservations 




facilitated an increased student 
enrolment (Fig. 5). While the 
administration blamed the unexpected 
growth of campus population for the 
hostel shortage, a substantial number 
of students accused the 
administration, particularly the Vice 
Chancellor, of misusing the OBC 
expansion funds for developing campus 
infrastructure in the Academic Block, 
instead of providing further hostel 
space. Demanding hostel for all, 
insistent student protests eventually 
evoked the provision of additional 
accommodation space. The design and arrangement of these new constructions would 
substantially change the appearance of the campus after 1999. 
 
 
3.2 Construction developments after the 1990s 
A few years after India’s economic ‘liberalization’ in 1991, JNU was granted a corpus fund, 
which facilitated the rapid development of the campus. The creation of housing up to the 
western boundary of the campus did not only change the campus geographical scale, but 
also altered its physical appearance. Described by critics as “massive urban slum” (Batabyal 
2014, 171), the Paschimabad campus area, established after 2000, indeed differs in 
constructional pattern and landscape design from the previously built units. In order to 
accommodate the increasing number of campus residents, the previous architectural style 
was abandoned and high-rise buildings were developed. Whereas in the units of Uttarakhand, 
Dakshinapuram, and Poorvanchal residents are accommodated in interlinked assemblages, 
Paschimabad’s housing areas are divided according to occupational groups. Here, students, 
karmacharis, and faculty members live in greater spatial distance from each other. Not only 
has the spacing between the single residential blocks increased, but also the distance 
between the individual student hostels. Especially the youngest hostel constructions on 
campus Koyna and Shipra (Fig. 3, no. 13 & 14), built between 2007 and 2011, show 
remarkable constructional deviations from the remaining hostels. One the one hand, the 
outwardly straight-shaped four-story buildings offer one third more rooms than previous 
constructions do. On the other hand, spatial planning had also considered the altering 
demographic patterns on campus. In 2005, most hostel beds were reserved for men; in 
contrast, the number of women students in campus noticeably rose (Fig. 6). Consequently, 
Koyna and Shipra hostel should provide space for female students. It was then argued that 
the provision of space exclusively for women required enhanced precautionary measures. In 
a bid to protect female residents, Koyna and Shipra hostel were developed as places 
surrounded by extensive paved areas and high fences. Contrary to the women hostels in the  






older parts of the campus, which are embedded into the residential units and well connected 
by streets and footpaths, Koyna and Shipra emerged as independent compartments. The two 
constructions on campus also differ from older constructions in terms of interior design. 
While older hostels provide differently sized and angled rooms, the more recent rooms are 
spacious, each equipped with comfortable furniture and a balcony. Referring to all three 
aspects – the secluded location of the hostels, the high number of inhabitants “who 
reluctantly meet in the mess [dining hall]” (Koyna Resident (f), personal communication, 
October 22, 2016) and the comfortableness of the rooms – many students allege that the 
specific spatial arrangement creates anonymity. This anonymity is commonly contrasted to 
the lively atmosphere found in older hostels, where “it’s very social, everybody is visiting 
[and] doors are always open” (Godavari Resident (f), personal communication, November 5, 
2016). Until now (2017), Koyna and Shipra are the only hostels on campus where the idea of 
minority protection is translated into spatial design (Fig. 7). However, this will change soon. 
In July 2017, the Minister of State for Development of North Eastern Region Dr. Jitendra 
Singh, laid the foundation stone of Barak hostel (Fig. 3, no. 16). Named after the river 
flowing through the North-Eastern regions of India, Barak will provide beds for an additional 
400 students. It is 100% funded by the North-Eastern Council, and will have 75% seats 
reserved for students from the North-East. At the cornerstone ceremony, the Minister 
emphasised that “JNU has more than 8,000 students, out of which there are more students 
from Northeast than any other State outside NE region” (Press Information Bureau 
Government of India Ministry for Development of North-East Region 2017) and the 
government would strive “to bring [the] rest of India closer to North East India” (ibid.). With 
a reservation quota based on the category of regional and explicitly ethnic-cultural 
belonging, Barak will be the first hostel on campus that breaks with the original idea of 
jointly accommodating students of diverse regional backgrounds. 
 
 
Fig. 7: Different architectural styles in Uttarakhand and Paschimabad. Left picture: Sutlej built 
in the 1970s; right picture: Koyna built in the 2000s (Kumar 2017) 
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3.3 Chapter conclusions: The constructional management of demographic 
divisions 
 
Walking along JNU main road is taking a walk along the timeline of JNU construction history. 
Coming from the northern main gate, one will pass Uttarakhand and Dakshinapuram campus 
unit. The units are constructional assemblages, interlinked by streets and multiple 
footpaths, bringing together university members at shops, restaurants, and dhabas. The 
areas are multifunctional, accessible to all campus residents, and until 2016 populated by 
many, day and night.12 However, upon entering Paschimabad campus unit, one observes a 
change in spatial pattern. Here, the constructional developments diverged from the former 
assemblage-like campus character. Instead, justified by the increased need for security and 
minority protection, compartmentalized units were developed. 
Hostel buildings are thus spatial strategies of managing campus demographic divisions. In 
this context, it is particularly interesting to examine the funding structure of the 
constructions, or to be more precise, the dissimilar effects funding has had on constructional 
implementations through time. In the 1990s, additional hostel space was (partly) financed 
using resources from the OBC expansion funds. The OBC expansion fund constructions did 
not lead to the physical separation of students defined by their social and economic 
backwardness. In contrast, Barak hostel, funded by the North-East Council, will 
accommodate students with explicit reference to their regional and ethnic-cultural origin. 
Whereas the division of students in accordance with the demographic category of caste 
remains unthinkable, allotting students according to their ethnic-culturally or regionally 
defined background has become acceptable. Nevertheless, the planned transformations 
evoke controversial responses amongst students: On the one hand, students (from the North-
East of India) frequently report ethnic discrimination against them and thus demand higher 
protective measures. Others fear that “if the university builds separate hostels for 
minorities, we all will be branded” (Student (f), personal communication, December 4, 
2016). The concept of Barak hostel continues the idea of compartmentalizing and parcelling 
residential space. Student dissension on the matter points to the controversial question of 
how the campus unity will be spatially asserted in a social environment that is increasingly 
perceived as diverse. It moreover highlights that demographic categories when translated 
into public institutional space become “not just a system of cultural representation, but also 
constitutive of people’s identities” (Das 2008, 204). 
 
4 Where is JNU studying? Spatial aesthetics and knowledge production in 
the Academic Block 
 
In the early 1970s, JNU’s Academic Block emerged as the nucleus of the campus. The first 
ever built interlinked school buildings accommodating centres from natural sciences, social 
sciences and humanities should embody the “unity of knowledge” (CCJNU n.d.). Therefore, 
                                                          
12 Already in the early 1970s JNU became famous for its night culture, including debates, discussions, 
chai, and late-night paratha. In the aftermaths of the 9th of Feb incidence, the administration, relying 
on the intensified need for security, cut the opening hours of the dhabas. Consequently, public 
squares became less populated at night. 
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JNU had always relied on state subsidies and offered scholarships and low-charge education 
to its students. By adhering to a multi-disciplinary educational philosophy and its welfare 
approach, the varsity assumes an ambiguous position within present India’s higher education 
landscape: On the one hand, JNU is still considered to be one of India’s best performing 
universities, ranked second in the India Ranking Report 2017. On the other hand, the public 
university is gradually moving (or moved) to the margins of an education sector that is 
increasingly oriented towards economic efficiency and skilled-bases trainings. The private 
actors’ economic demands and their ideological claims challenge JNU’s curricula and 
research activities, which so far has derived its academic legitimacy from the production of 
generic and secular knowledge. As such, the (indirect) effects of privatization have become 
perceptible on the JNU Campus. By closely examining the constructional aesthetics of the 
Academic Block and the spatial atmospheres13 it produces, the following two sections, 4.1 
and 4.2, will investigate JNU’s varying learning environments. Section 4.3 will briefly discuss 
the preceding findings with simultaneous consideration. 
 
4.1 Inside the classrooms: The economic orientation of knowledge production 
 
From the cynosure and centre of the Academic Block, JNU’s central nine-storied library 
building (Fig. 8, no. 26), it is only a two-minute walk to a set of seven school buildings (Fig. 
8, no. 27-32). These first ever built schools on campus equal each other in architecture: 
Widening towards the top and funnel-shaped, they were designed in the early 1970s by the 
architect Kukreja to represent blossoms “where knowledge grows, and knowledge must 
bloom” (Former Student of Moonis Raza (m), personal communication, April 17, 2017). Lined 
up in close proximity to each other, the Schools were designed to facilitate formal and 
informal contacts between specialists in different disciplines and to weaken inter-discipline 
barriers (CCJNU n.d.). The idea remains successful to this day. On the stairs in front of the 
School of Social Sciences II (SSS II), one can join a discussion between students of Sociology, 
Linguistics, Geography, and Biology before classes. The classrooms are filled with a multi-
disciplinary audience and the discussions are continued. Depending on their construction 
year, the classrooms differ from each other in terms of interior design. While there are few 
newer rooms, the schools’ committee rooms are equipped with air-conditioning, and leather 
covered chairs, the bulk of classrooms in JNU provides fans, wooden benches and 
blackboards to students and the teaching personnel (Fig. 9). The atmosphere created by the 
classroom design is perceived and interpreted differently, depending on the speakers 
“socialization of perception” (Löw 2008, 45). In particular, students who come to JNU for 
their postgraduate studies from private colleges, evaluate JNU’s learning environment as 
outdated and dingy. Since it roots in a shared narrative on the divergent aesthetics of public 
and private learning environments, the classroom atmosphere becomes perceptual and thus 
discussable. It is the 
popular imagination that always associates […] public institutions with dinginess. Everyone 
knows that in public institutions infrastructure development takes time, because the money 
                                                          
13 In accordance with Martina Löw (2008), this work defines atmosphere as “the external effect of 
social goods and human beings realized perceptually in their spatial ordering. This means that 
atmospheres arise through the perception of interactions between people and/or from the external 
effect of social goods in their arrangement” (Löw 2008, 44). 
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is not sufficient or not utilized properly. In that sense JNU is falling into that category. It is 
definitely not high tech. High tech is what you would associate with private institutions 
(Student (m), personal communication, November 16, 2016). 
In terms of interior design and physical equipment, the distinction between private and 
public learning environments could only emerge during the 2000s when the number of private 
institutions rapidly grew. Until the early 1990s, India’s higher education sector had been 
heavily nationalized and even privately established institutions were under the authority of 
the protectionist state (Agarwal 2007, 199). Following India’s economic liberalization in 
1991, higher education institutions were encouraged to adopt market-relevant policies. In 
turn, public budgets for education were constantly withdrawn. The government’s gradual 
disengagement from the education sector is intended to encourage the active citizen to 
invest in his or her education and aims to get Indian citizens off the welfare roll and directly 
into the workforce. In view of the present MHRD, disconnecting education from the hitherto 
welfare approach will create “a more competitive environment in the higher education 
sector and foster growth, which is needed to achieve the target of 10% increase in Gross 
Enrolment Ratio (GER)” (Centre for Civil Society 2014, 4). The aspired self-financing 
character of higher education, along with the enormous rise in student numbers, has 
gradually changed the aesthetics of academic environments. 
In India’s flourishing education market, private universities have started to compete for 
potential customers – students and their families, who are able and willing to invest in their 
future employability. These days, institutions advertise their “world's best […] campus design 
and infrastructure, learning and living spaces” created by “American architects” (SRM 
University 2017). JNU’s physical arrangement contradicts the popular imagination that 
Fig. 8: Map of the Academic Block 
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connects the concepts of job market-oriented education to a specific high-end design and 
equipment. JNU, designed in the spirit of indigenous modernism, is not equipped with the 
latest technology or furniture, nor does it offer undergraduate skill-based trainings, self-
financed courses, or E-learning programmes. The narrative force of its learning environment 
aesthetics turns JNU, once developed as “thoroughly modern” (CCJNU n.d.), into a campus 
that is either looked upon through the lens of nostalgia or is regarded as outdated. JNU 
produces an atmosphere of “an old world in a more socialist time, with a certain sort of 
values of education and a diverse 
educational space” (Student (m), 
personal communication, 
November 16, 2016). Those 
values of education do not only 
contradict the popular 
imagination of the economically 
efficient university, but also 
conflict with the narration of the 
government’s spirit of Hindutva, 
which will be further scrutinized 
in the following section. 
 
 
4.2 Red vs. saffron: The political colours of knowledge production 
 
The interlinked and multidisciplinary academic complex also accommodates the Centre for 
Historical Studies (CHS). Founded in 1970, CHS is one of the oldest centres in the School of 
Social Sciences (Fig. 8, no. 29) and certainly one of India’s most prestigious. Established and 
guided by nationally and internationally successful historians such as Bipan Chandra, Romila 
Thapar, Sarvepalli Gopal, and Satish Chandra, the Centre for Historical Studies set new 
standards in historiography by developing post-colonial and Marxist14 perspectives on Indian 
history. Developing further and promoting the narration of an Indian nation based on 
secularism, rationalism, and liberalism,15 the CHS substantially contributed to the 
university’s academic reputation and excellence. 
Following the 1990s, the Academic Block has noticeably dispersed and grown beyond the 
first constructed complex of seven schools. The buildings erected after 2000 were 
predominantly developed at the fringes of the Academic Block. Those constructions do not 
only differ from the older complex with respect to spatial alignment, but also in 
                                                          
14 It was the Marxist scholars’ national and international success, rather than their considerable 
number, that earned JNU the reputation of a Marxist hub, or the image of a monolithic red block. In 
fact, the number of openly confessing Marxists, especially amongst faculty members, was and is small 
(cf. i.a. Bhambhri 1996, 84). 
15 (1) Secularism, understood as the (state’s) responsibility to treat all religions equal; (2) A 
rationalism based on two intertwined assumptions: Firstly, that there is an intrinsic worth in knowing 
the truth; secondly that there is a belief, often based in superstition or propaganda, that must be 
debunked to reveal this truth. (3) A form of liberalism based on the assumption that individuals are 
able to think and take responsibility for themselves; it sees the free discourse as a necessary condition 
for academic and social progress. 
Fig. 9: Classroom in the School of Language (Maxwell 2017) 
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architecture. Particularly noteworthy, though often overlooked due to its secluded location, 
is the Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies (CSS) (Fig. 8, no. 39). When leaving the academic 
complex in a southern direction, one must cross JNU Ring Road, pass a small dhaba, and 
traverse a fenced park to reach the Centre. The Sanskrit Centre breaks away from the other 
Schools and Centres in more than one way. With the support of the then-incumbent Vajpayee 
government, especially its Union Human Resources Development Minister Murli Manohar 
Joshi, the CSS building was constructed in 2001 and is architecturally shaped in the form of 
a Swastika. Its very shape was received with controversy on campus. On the one side, the 
Swastika-shaped Centre is sympathetically interpreted as the long-awaited merger of “the 
traditional scholars/scholarship and the mainstream university” and is considered to “extend 
and validate the classical theories by applying them […] to contemporary Indian reality” 
(Jawaharlal Nehru University 2017). On the contrary, the Centre’s opponents view the 
building as the right-wing government’s institutional effort towards the saffronization of 
JNU’s education philosophy. 
Saffronization (often used as derogatory term) refers to Hindutva’s influence on India’s 
memory politics: It claims “a uniform, monolithic Hindu identity for Indian civilization, often 
defined as Aryan and upper-caste” (Thapar 2009, 96). As such, it advocates a specific form 
of historiography that emphasises an ancient Hindu-Indian culture, foremost by excluding 
other, particularly Muslim, cultural heritages existent on the Republic’s territory. Historians, 
working in the spirit of Hindutva, derive their historical facts from ‘ancient Hindu’ scripts16 
and call for their nationwide implementation into curricula. Consequently, we have a 
continuing debate between Hindutva proponents and secular historians, who adhere to the 
rational principles established and elevated by the JNU’s historians and sociologists. By 
examining the personages involved in that long-running Indian “battle over history” (ibid., 
94), the provocation caused by the development of CSS becomes more comprehensible. 
We have to revisit 1961, when the incumbent education minister Chagla – the very same 
minister who would three years later strongly support, pre-formulate, and supervise the JNU 
Bill – established the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT). The 
NCERT became responsible for the revision of Indian history textbooks, thus providing schools 
all over India with “secular and rational explanations of the past” (ibid., 87). The editorial 
board established for that purpose was (amongst others) joined by the prestigious historians 
Nurul Hasan, Sarvepalli Gopal, Satish Chandra, and Romila Thapar. Nurul Hasan would 
become the education minister in PM Indira Gandhi’s cabinet and assign the first teaching 
positions at Jawaharlal Nehru University; all other named historians would become the 
renowned guides at the university’s School of Social Sciences. When examining the personnel 
overlaps, we are able to understand how deeply the Indian history of historiography is 
intertwined with the development of Jawaharlal Nehru University’s knowledge production. 
Already in the 1970s, the first set of NCERT textbooks had caused aversion on the side of 
Hindu nationalists. However, it was only in the late 1990s under the BJP/NDA government, 
that Hindutva’s perspective on history could also impact public institutions. Amongst the 
Vajpayee government’s parliamentarians, the probably strongest proponent of 
                                                          
16 i.a. the Vedas are cited to prove that the automobile, the television, and the aeroplane are 
genuinely Hindu-Indian inventions stemming from the ‘Vedic age’. 
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‘hindutvaisation’ was Murli Manohar Joshi, who in his function as Human Resources 
Development Minister, firstly made the development of the Centre for Sanskrit Studies on 
JNU Campus possible. Against the background of these ideological disagreements on Indian 
historiography (also known as the ‘NCERT textbook controversies’), it is less surprising that 
the arrangement of CSS was perceived as Hindutva ideology’s undermining of the secular, 
rational, and liberal achievements of JNU’s School of Social Sciences and its Centre for 
Historical Studies. In its secluded location, the Centre for Sanskrit Studies with its highly 
specialized course offer forms a unit in its own. It contradicts the philosophy of unity of 
knowledge initially developed on campus. Its exceptional architecture or its “design of 
commemoration” (Soja 1996, 191) embodies a nationalist knowledge that diverges from what 
JNU so far has been renowned for. Therefore, it is a constructional witness of India’s politico-
ideological shift of power in an enduring battle over historiography and knowledge 
production taking place on campuses all over India. 
 
4.3 Chapter conclusions: The politicizations of campus space  
 
Upon examination of the Academic Block in its entirety, we can state that the first built 
complex consisting of interlinked schools and their centres is still the dominant academic 
construction on campus. The multidisciplinary and flexible schedule of the schools 
emphasises the production of discursive, generic, and secular knowledge. So far, that has 
served its purpose: Until 2017, JNU’s “research standards, programmes, and outputs have 
consistently been judged to be quite excellent” (Kidwai 2017). However, within an 
educational landscape that is increasingly oriented towards the diverse private actors’ 
economic demands and their politico-ideological claims, JNU’s educational focus is about to 
diminish in national value. The public university has thus become negatively affected by the 
rapid privatization of India’s higher education sector, not least because the respective 
governments after 1991, have encouraged their public institutions to engage in the process 
of economic and politico-ideologic knowledge reorientation. Especially the presently 
incumbent Modi-government considers the merger of a university’s market integration and 
its increased orientation towards Hindu nationalism (also understood as Hindu spiritualism) 
as the key driver for India’s national development and cohesion. The government envisions 
both, global market integration and Hindutva ideology, as able to turn the nation into a 
knowledge superpower. That vision is contradicted by the prevailing parts of JNU’s learning 
environments. JNU – as already mentioned – is neither equipped with latest technology or 
furniture, nor does it offer skill-based trainings, self-financed courses, or E-learning 
programmes. On the contrary, it produces an old world atmosphere, thereby representing a 
more socialist form of education. In other words, JNU’s classrooms do not spread a shiny 
Make in India atmosphere, yet. Thus, it conflicts with the government’s narration of 
nationalism. 
 
5 Where is JNU protesting? Spatial accessibility and academic autonomy 
 
Publicly referred to as the left bastion, JNU has the reputation of being a “politically very 
vibrant campus” (Student (f), personal communication, November 21, 2016). JNU students 
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of the first years established a vivid political culture on campus that valued “the right to 
dissent the essence of democracy” (Batabyal 2014, 375). Appropriating campus space, 
claiming administrative participation, and inclusive decision-making processes became an 
inherent part of JNU culture. Student politics in JNU takes various forms. It ranges from the 
creation of student parties and yearly elections of a Students’ Union, to producing 
pamphlets, posters, and wall art, and conducting rallies, effigy burnings, awareness 
campaigns, (hunger) strikes, and long-term occupations. On the one hand, JNU Campus, with 
its liberal outlook to student politics, has proved a successful training ground for a significant 
number of students who became renowned public figures, civil servants, politicians, and 
diplomats. On the other hand, it has brought the public institution into disrepute several 
times throughout its history. While in 1983 after violent outrages JNU was discussed as “the 
sick university” (cf. Batabyal 2014, 400), it was branded anti-national in the aftermaths of 
the 9th of Feb incidence in 2016. Thus, JNU’s student politics provoked and still provoke an 
India-wide discourse on whether students should be “political propagandists” (Batabyal 
2014, 105), or whether the politicisation of campus space leads to a university’s moral and 
academic “decline” (ibid.). This question transforms the JNU Campus into a matter of public 
interest and governmental concern and has affected its institutional design.  
The following more closely examines the diverse political strategies of appropriating campus 
space. It focuses on the various aspects of spatial accessibility and restriction as key factors 
for shaping the geopolitical landscapes of JNU Campus. Firstly, in an overview of JNU’s 
politically active parties and their forms of visibility in campus, section 5.1 investigates the 
changing relation of JNU towards those beyond the institution. Section 5.2 then tracks the 
changing spatiality of the university’s Administration Block through time. Here, spatial 
strategies have played a significant role in defining the boundaries of acceptable political 
actions in public campus space. By summarizing the preceding findings, section 5.3 discusses 
the (de-)politicisation of JNU Campus from a spatial perspective. 
 
5.1 The windowed walls of JNU: On the lookout for student politics 
 
When walking on campus, JNU’s walls strike the eye most. The red bricks of JNU’s Schools, 
shopping complexes, and canteens are papered with pamphlets and posters that address 
late-breaking issues and invite the spectator to cultural programmes and protests. Positioned 
above these, huge wall art, resembling windows to the world’s affairs, raise awareness for 
national and international, social and economic issues (Fig. 10-16). The reason why the issues 
displayed are not limited to campus concerns but instead link the university to broader 
societal struggles outside the campus walls, roots in the structuring of Indian student 
politics. The understanding that university members should engage in larger societal 
negotiations re-emerged in the mid-1960s. It was after the first PM’s demise in 1964 that 
academia broke away with the Nehruvian paradigm of the unpolitical citizen (Roy 2007, 167) 
and that Indian campuses turned into forums for politics (Batabyal 2014, 104-105). By 
addressing issues from beyond the universities and politicising them within the campuses, 
academic communities claimed a greater say in defining the “problems of the society” 
(CCJNU n.d.). In this manner, ‘society’ was reimagined as a public university’s national 
responsibility. That academic attitude altered the inside-outside relation of public 
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campuses, insofar as universities, by relying on their academic autonomy, redefined their 
relation towards the Indian state and their governmental patron. The outreach of student 
politics became a question of the very scope and societal standing of an institution. The 
reasons for those developments lie primarily in the organization of Indian campus politics 
itself. Most of India’s student parties are either official youth organizations of nationally 
represented political parties, or under the ideological and financial godparenthood of 
broader social movements and cultural associations, which means that student politics is 
closely connected to a political sphere beyond its campus walls. Engaging in student politics 
is not only regarded as a student’s societal duty, but also as a student’s career springboard 
to state or central politics and civil services. Although JNU is still called the left bastion, 
the times in which the university’s student politics was exclusively represented by socialist, 
communist, and progressive-liberal parties (Batabyal 2014, 330ff.) are long over. The rise 
and diversification of student movements started in the late 1990s. Then it split from “a 
monolithic block to many different topics and groups” (Alumni (m), personal communication, 
November 15, 2016). In 2015, more than a dozen political parties were counted on campus. 
Simultaneously to the diversification of political opinion, the number of politically 
disenchanted or those who publicly withhold their political opinion has grown. Thus, contrary 
to widespread opinion, everyone residing in the left bastion would heavily engage in politics, 
but only the minority of JNUites actively participates in party politics or protest marches. 
While, prior to 2012, protests with 100 to 200 participants were common, between 2012 and 
2016 “hardly 20, 30 people were seen protesting in Ad-Block, shouting, sloganeering” (Left 
Activist (f), personal communication, December 2, 2016). Due to the shrinking number of 
political participants, the activists fear the “increasing depoliticization of campus space” 
(Activist (m), personal communication, July 28, 2016). The ‘unpolitical’ students’ have many 
reasons for refraining from campus politics. On the one hand, political participation has 
become a factor of the students’ abode. To reduce the pressure on the overstrained hostel 
system, students who have housing options in Delhi are not accommodated on campus. 
Consequently, a rising number of day scholars leave JNU in the afternoon and do not 
participate in the political activities – the cultural programmes and awareness campaigns, 
the marches, and the protests – that generally happen in the evening. On the other hand, 
the individuals’ attendance at political events is made a concern of academic performance: 
The majority I know […] who are like into politics, they are academically very good. […] But 
I'm facing difficulties here in following classes, because I was studying in a different way, 
because we were reading different texts and didn’t speak English. Now I have to read a lot. 
I have to sacrifice the majority of my time there [pointing to the Central library]. That's 
the problem. The whole night they are protesting. If I go to protest every day, I have to 
bung all my classes. You know that that's the reality (Student (f), personal communication, 
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Fig. 10: Wall art by the Bhagat 
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elections (Heyink 2016) 
Fig. 16: Wall art by the Birsa 





That an individual’s academic performance, and hence her or his possibility to politically 
participate in campus, is a matter of broader socio-economic complexities rather than a 
merely individual decision, is a principal argument of the student party BAPSA. The Birsa 
Ambedkar Phule Students Association (BAPSA) was established by members and sympathizers 
of the United Dalit Students Forum (UDSF) in 2014. In contrast to the UDSF, which already 
formed as cultural organization in 1990/1991, BAPSA was birthed as an explicitly political 
party. It is oriented towards the ideas of anti-caste reformers and Dalit-Bahujan17 icons, 
most prominently Jyotiba Phule and Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who nationalized the issue of 
caste-based oppression. By assuming their political vision and making it an issue inside JNU, 
BAPSA’s political formation was welcomed on campus with a high number of votes in the 
JNUSU elections held in 2016 and 2017. The party stands up for a public campus space that 
provides freedom from identity politics based on caste or communal belonging, and instead 
strives to strengthen social mobility: 
In a so-called progressive campus like JNU, the experience is articulated by the students 
who move in this place. But the students who come from marginalized communities have 
less space to move and less space to articulate themselves. For a larger background of social 
complexities, they haven't had the chance to learn proper English in school, so they can’t 
participate in the debates. It is about language, it is also about dress code, about your life 
style, everything which matters to your presence in public. And the organizations like BAPSA 
provide the space for the people who are coming with this kind of cultural baggage. We 
provide space in pamphlets, posters, rallies, debates (BAPSA Activist (m), personal 
communication, December 1, 2016). 
According to their slogan, Lal Bhagwa ek hai. Saare comrade fake hain (Red, Saffron is one. 
All comrades are fake), BAPSA not only politically opposes long established left parties, but 
also opposes rising right-wing forces, who are represented on campus by the party of Akhil 
Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP). In contrast to left or Ambedkarite politics, which 
explicitly derive their political legitimacy from issues outside the campus walls, ABVP 
proclaims a far more campus-centric view. Representing Hindu nationalist politics, ABVP 
wants to address the “real student problems” (ABVP Activist (m), personal communication, 
August 28, 2016) on campus. Although the student party already formed in 1949, the party’s 
political ideology, oriented towards the RSS and the currently governing BJP, was rarely 
represented on campus until the year 2000. Then, for the first time in JNU history, an ABVP 
candidate won the JNUSU election and became Students’ Union President. Fifteen years 
later, the party won a panel post again. Both times, ABVP’s election success coincided with 
a BJP government in the Centre. With the ruling party’s support, ABVP kept their electoral 
promises regarding the enhancements of the campus infrastructure. Because of their 
                                                          
17 The term Bahujan, meaning ‘the majority of people’, is most relevant to contemporary Ambedkarite 
thought. It is part of a language that wants to foster anti-caste resistance. It roots in a specific 
understanding of India’s structures and history of social inequality. The use of the term Bahujan shall 
rise awareness for the understanding that caste is not a Dalit/Adivasi problem only, but that the 
majority of people on the subcontinent, cutting across religion, ethnicities and geographies, is 
understood as caste-bound and ruled by “upper”-caste minorities. The domination of the few over the 
majority is referred to as ‘Brahminism’ (Cháirez-Garza 2014, 44ff.). 
28 
 
politically right-leaning set of moral values, ABVP’s political dominance in a so-called 
progressive campus was prevented. Oriented towards the ideals of Hindutva, ABVP aims to 
“increas[e] national pride” (ABVP Activist (f), personal communication, August 28, 2016) 
inside JNU and places the idea of an all-Indian conformity over the leftists’ right to dissent. 
This position reflects the party’s own estimation of JNU’s standing and position within the 
Indian nation: “JNU is as any other university. We are India. We are integral part of India. 
That’s most important” (ABVP Activist (m), personal communication, November 12, 2016). 
That perspective on JNU as a fractal or a model of the Indian nation collides with the 
perspective of left and Ambedkarite activists, who derive their political legitimacy from 
JNU’s exceptional model role for the Indian nation: 
I think there is a boundary between the rest of the society and JNU because every common 
sense we have in the society, it gets reversed in JNU. But the boundary is more in the sense 
that we want to undo everything bad that is there in the society. JNU actually represents 
the heart of India. It represents the soul of India in the sense that the ideas that come out 
from JNU represent what our country ideally should be: really democratic, really secular, 
really socialist kind of a way (Left Activist (m), personal communication, October 23, 2016). 
The diverging perspectives on JNU’s relation to the Indian nation – the university’s very 
location, or rightful position in the nation – led to the left and right activists clash on 9 
February 2016. On this day, during an event organized by a left-wing student organisation to 
remember the death anniversary of Afzal Guru,18 a number of unidentified people were 
heard sloganeering Bharat ki barbadi tak jung rahegi (We keep fighting our battle until India 
is destroyed). Informed by upset members of the right-wing ABVP, the university’s Vice 
Chancellor, only inaugurated a month before by the BJP-government, called the police by 
way of exception. The executive forces violently ended the event and arrested the then-
incumbent JNUSU President Kanhaiya Kumar and two other students. The 9th of Feb incidence 
became the prelude to the so-called JNU controversy. In the aftermath, the campus 
spatiality was decisively rearranged. Citing reasons of security, the administration gradually 
closed down hitherto open campus spaces. For example: dhaba opening hours were 
restricted and ID checks, the number of security guards, and video surveillance were 
increased. These measures taken should prevent protesters from gathering or occupying 
open squares and alter JNU’s geopolitical landscape. Since 2016, the series of student and 
faculty member protests and the administration’s counter-protests has, primarily, led to the 
rearrangement of the university’s Administration Block. This process of negotiating space is 
further described in the following section. 
 
                                                          
18 The Kashmiri Mohammad Afzal Guru was executed on 9th February 2013 for his alleged participation 
in the Indian Parliament attack in 2001. Until today, his legal case divides the nation into two sides. 
For the one side, Afzal Guru represents Kashmiri separatism and the national threat of terrorism. 
Conversely, the other side questions the lawfulness of Afzal Guru’s execution stating that he did not 
receive a sufficient legal representation. For the latter, Afzal Guru’s name has emerged as a metaphor 
for governmental injustice and structural discrimination against minorities. 
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5.2 At the Administration Block: The changing spatiality of protest 
 
The protest directed against the university administration, which seen as the government’s 
representative, is as old as the JNU institution. The students opposing state decreed 
regulations,19 and thereby placing the university administration and state authority in 
question, substantially defined the ways in which JNU correlates to its outside. Quite often, 
the student protest brought the campus in public disrepute: While in 1983 after violent 
outrages JNU was discussed as “the sick university” (cf. Batabyal 2014, 400), it was branded 
anti-national in the aftermaths of the 9th of Feb incidence. “Spectacles of dissent” (D’Arcus 
2006, 14) have left their spatial marks inside JNU Campus. On the one hand, students’ 
political interference led to the further development of residential constructions in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the 2000s, objecting students prevented the administration from renting 
out campus land to private companies (which, in most of India’s public campuses has become 
common practice). On the other hand, places accessible to political participation have 
visibly shrunk over the last two decades. Citing security and protection, JNU’s huge 
afforested areas have become restricted abodes, public meeting places have been gradually 
closed down, CCTVs and the presence of security guards have increased over the past years. 
Most significantly, the spatial rearrangement of JNU’s Administration Block exemplifies the 
key role that spatial accessibility plays in political participation. During the decade-long trial 
of strengths between students, faculty members, and the administration, the physical 
appearance of the Administration Block has remarkably altered (Fig. 17). Until the late 
1990s, the administration building was located on rocky and unpaved terrain. Its driveways 
were not asphalted, and there was not a fenced park surround the building.  
                                                          
19 i.a., in 2009, JNU rejected the Lyngdoh Committee's recommendations that targeted the 
reformulation of the student election regulations; in 2015, JNU students, leading the Occupy UGC 
movement in Delhi, protested the University Grants Commission’s decision to terminate financial 
support for thousands of post-graduate students. Despite the protest, both regulations were 
eventually implemented in 2016/2017. 




The main entrance, unlike today, was located at ground level, immediately next to a roofed 
terrace, where protesters would settle in for long-term occupation. Consequently, 
administrative officers including the Vice Chancellor unavoidably encountered the protesters 
when entering or leaving the building. These spatially induced encounters are said to have 
fostered the exchange of arguments between the two antagonist parties and thus are thought 
to have had a mediating effect on the disputes. In 1999, a huge student protest, primarily 
addressing the hostel crisis, took place at the Administration Block. In the course of events, 
the administration ordered armed police forces to campus. The police violently ended the 
occupation and arrested several students. In the aftermath, the Administration Block was 
spatially rearranged. Citing the need for infrastructural develop-ment, modernization, and 
beautification, the square was asphalted and a fenced park was created. Consequently, 
protest space shrank. Further, the main entrance was relocated to the northern  side of the 
building. The occupied protest zone then turned away from the main entrance and no longer 
served as a space of encounter between the two antagonistic parties. During the 2000s, the 
Administration Square was further equipped with CCTV. That functioned as a deterrent to 
protesters who were “scared of punitive measures” (Pinjra Tod Activist (f), personal 
communication, December 2, 2016) to be taken by the university administration. In the 
opinion of present and former student activists, the space then had become sanitized and 
securitized. Consequently, openly articulated protest at the Administration Block decreased. 
The 9th of Feb incidence changed the landscape. After the Student Union’s President 
Kanhaiya Kumar was arrested and JNU was branded anti-national, faculty members in 
solidarity with thousands of students gathered at the Administration Block. Under the banner 
of What the nation really needs to know a lecture series on nationalism was established, 
welcoming invited speakers from JNU and academics from other Indian institutions, 
politicians, and activists.20 By taking the classes to the Administration Block – taking 
education out of place – demonstrated its effect. After appropriating the Admin Square, the 
protesters renamed it Freedom Square. Banners fixed on the building walls displayed the 
square’s new name and claimed the university members’ right to dissent. The roofed terrace 
was re-occupied by students on hunger strike. Tents were erected at the foot of the stairs 
where students protested against the hostel crisis. JNU students and teachers had 
appropriated the Administration Block, turning it into a place of dissent. Pictures of the 
protest, countless times reproduced in newspapers and television, also went viral on the 
internet. Freedom Square became both the proof of JNU’s anti-national character and the 
symbol of a university’s successful defence of its academic autonomy. 
The square was rearranged again by mid-2016. Freedom Square was gradually turned back 
into Admin Block and protest was subdued by spatial means. The administration ordered the 
erection of barriers, rendering the square almost inaccessible. The previously occupied 
roofed area was fenced with an iron grill. Mobile and permanent barriers in front of the 
building’s stairs prevent groups of people from gathering or approaching the main entrance 
of the administration building. The latest building developments have transformed the 
angled architecture of the administration building into a straight, assessable, and thus 
                                                          
20 The lectures are published in the following: Azad, R., Nair, J., Singh, M. & Roy M. S. on behalf of 
JNU Teachers’ Association (eds.) (2016): What the Nation Really Needs to Know: The JNU Nationalism 
Lectures. Noida: HarperCollins 
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protest-free area. The spatial rearrangements of the Administration Block have become the 
“normative frameworks that define the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in public space” 
(D’Arcus 2006, 29). 
 
5.3 Chapter conclusions: A public university caught between Admin Block and 
Freedom Square 
 
Following the changing geopolitical topography of JNU Campus, one can track its changes 
over the past decades. Initially contested by left leaning (communist, socialist, and liberal) 
parties, the campus was used by university members to negotiate matters of wider societal 
concern. It was that understanding of a ‘societal mission’, vital on campus until today, from 
which activists derived their duty and privilege to impact the university’s administrative 
decisions. Over the past two decades, this privilege has become curved. By rearranging, i.e. 
parcelling, and thereby functionally converting places, protest space has noticeably shrunk. 
The more the campus became parcelled, the more it was perceived as depoliticized by those 
who argued in favour of their right to dissent. 
During the 1990s, the political spectrum broadened on campus. The rising number of 
university members that refrained from taking a political position or proposed a more 
campus-centric political agenda called JNU’s ‘bastion-like exceptionalism’ into question. 
Thus, the diversification of political opinion enlarged the number of possible perspectives 
from which the university could be viewed in its relation to the outside: the government, a 
society at large, and hence the Indian nation. The divergently articulated understandings of 
JNU’s positioning within the Indian nation in turn impacted the possibilities to evaluate the 
legitimacy of political action taken inside campus. Controversies about the legitimacy of 
political action eventually led to the clashes between left- and right-wing forces, such as 
took place on 9 February 2016. The 9th of Feb incidence is thus not that much a discussion 
about oppressed politicization or illegitimate depoliticization of JNU. It rather is the 
question that asks “which sorts of politics the campus should be used for and to which sorts 
of politics the campus should be familiar with” (Activist (f), personal communication, 
December 6, 2016). The spatial rearrangement of the Administration Block exemplifies how 
actors negotiate this question and define boundaries of action by spatial strategies. In this 
case, space is no mere arena for political participation. Political action literally takes place. 
Spatial strategies shape “often-intense disagreements about the nature of legitimate 
dissent; of who is allowed to do what, where, with what kind of symbolic and political effect 
and weight” (D’Arcus 2006, 15). In the context of such way of thinking, the question whether 
JNU is a politicized or depoliticized space loses significance. The actual question is: Which 
position should JNU take within the Indian nation? Should the institution stand as a 
pioneering model for India. Or should it rather become a model of a (somehow) uniformed 
nation? 
 
6 The changing tracks of India’s higher education development 
 
The previous three chapters closely examined the JNU Campus as public institutional space. 
They related the concepts of demographic categorisation, knowledge production, and power 
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allocation to the three geographically approachable aspects of building distribution, 
constructional aesthetics, and spatial accessibility. Thus, they have tracked the changes of 
India’s higher education development and highlighted their impact on JNU’s spatial 
development. We have seen how the concepts of nation have changed throughout the past 
four and half decades. This final chapter aims to further interpret the findings by positioning 
them according to their common reference point, that is the Indian nation. By making JNU’s 
national exclusion a question of positioning, this chapter will summarize the perspectives 
from which the university can be viewed. This will provide answers to the question: Where 
is JNU? On that basis, I want to reflect on the applicability of the theoretical framework 
applied to conclude with some final remarks. 
 
6.1 Viewed from different angles: The multiple locations of Jawaharlal Nehru 
University 
 
The late 1960s’ post-colonial nation-building efforts made the concepts of nation a 
benchmark of institutional design. It was the goal of Jawaharlal Nehru University’s founders 
to translate their own vision of nationhood into campus design. JNU’s planning was based on 
distinctive assumptions regarding India’s demographic structuring (diversity), its economic 
framework (socialism), its philosophy of knowledge production (secularism, rationalism, and 
liberalism), and administrative power allocation (academic autonomy). Translating a 
historically and politically unique vision of the Indian nation into spatial design lastingly 
interlinked the public institution with the concepts of nation, which defined the concepts of 
Indianness or nationhood as the basis for legitimacy of the institution. Rejecting colonial 
structuring of higher education, the establishment of Jawaharlal Nehru University in the 
1960s became an institutional flagship project. It aimed to redefine the relationship between 
the Indian government and the Indian citizen per se. Thus, JNU’s foundations were laid on 
an administrative intersection point: On the one hand, the varsity was established as central 
university. At the same time, it was granted an unprecedented degree of autonomy. This 
division of power made JNU Campus the meeting place of two potentially powerful actors – 
the government and the university’s academic community. Positioning JNU on that very 
intersection point was interpreted as democratic and constitutional, thus truly national. 
Officially, JNU’s positioning has not altered up to now. The university is still formally rooted 
in this democratic intersection point of the government and the academic community. 
Nevertheless, the very configuration of the two intersecting lines – the Indian government 
and the academic community – has fundamentally changed over the past four and a half 
decades. The reconfigurations in the state-citizen relation have altered the possible 
perspectives from which the role of the public institution and its position within the Indian 
nation can be evaluated. Insofar it has broadened the possibilities of localizing JNU. 
Envisioned to become a university that would be “different from all other universities in 
India and therefore be unique in itself” (Education Minister (1969–71) V.K.R.V. Rao as cited 
in Batabyal 2014, 27), JNU Campus indeed emerged as a model space for India. It was during 
the 1990s, India’s political and economic watershed decade, that other visions of the nation 
gradually gained in interpretive power inside public institutions and thus entered the JNU 
Campus. The previously dominant concepts of diversity, socialism, and 
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rationalism/liberalism were supplemented by ideas of social differentiation (i.e. the 
demographic consideration of caste or cultural-ethnicity), and diverging forms of knowledge. 
Hitherto dominant educational values were challenged by privatization and marketization. 
Negotiating the university’s adjustment to the new imperatives of economic efficiency and 
democratization has altered its constructional patterns. The constructional assemblages of 
Uttarakhand, Dakshinapuram, and Poorvanchal were supplemented by the residential 
compartments found in Paschimabad. The first ever academic complex consisting of 
interlinked Schools and their Centres was extended by new Centres developed at the fringes 
of the Academic Block. Spatially secluded units, such as the Special Centre for Sanskrit 
Studies, have made room for diverging educational ideologies on the JNU Campus. The 
increasing privatization of India’s higher education landscape has changed the understanding 
and perception of modernity. JNU, once conceptualized as thoroughly modern, has become 
subjected to depreciation. Since 1991, Indian governments have aimed to merge the socio-
economic processes of democratization and marketization. India’s integration of the higher 
education sector into the global education market demanded the enhancement of national 
coherent standards. Standardization became the attempt to transform JNU from a model for 
Indian university into a model of Indian institution. Therefore, in the governments’ view, 
the need for standardization justified the gradual withdrawal of the varsity’s granted 
autonomous administrative structures. Hence, following the 1990s, one can observe the 
incremental parcelling of space. The compartmentalization of space coincides with the 
allocation of power away from the academic community and towards the administration. It 
was within those negotiation processes that JNU’s exceptionalism eventually could undergo 
a process of reinterpretation: Hitherto seen as an institutional role model, it then could also 
be interpreted as a national misfit. In the words of its accusers, it has become anti-national, 
or a hub of terrorism and treason. 
By examining the campus in its entirety, we can state that JNU today accommodates two 
dominant spatial patterns: The constructional assemblages developed before the 1990s and 
the compartmentalized units developed after the 1990s. However, the two spatial patterns 
do not contradict each other. Only in their joint composition do they form the one common 
place that is JNU Campus. Within that common place, people gather in solidarity or 
controversy, in public spaces, in joint canteens, or separate from each other behind hostel 
fences. Similar to the two spatial patterns that stand in proximity, the diverging 
understandings of JNU’s location within the Indian nation must be understood as 
complementarities. Their common reference concept is the Indian nation. This, however, is 
viewed from different perspectives. The one perspective defines JNU’s position as 
exceptional. It is thought to be “the microcosm of India” (Activist (f), personal 
communication, April 12, 2016) or a place where “every common sense we have in the 
society […] gets reversed” (Activist (m), personal communication, October 23, 2016). This 
idea of JNU’s exceptionalism is countered by those who understand the nation as a holistic 
entity. In order to maintain national harmony, a single institution must not stand out but be 
consistent with its outside. In this perspective, any form of violation of the national code of 
conduct called dissent must be sanctioned with exclusion. Dissent is marked as anti-national 
and the culprit is normatively dislocated on the enemy’s side. He, she or (in case of an 
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institution) it should go to Pakistan. On 9 February 2016, those two powerful perspectives 
collided and evoked a nation-wide controversy about JNU’s very position: Inside or outside 
the Indian nation? Was JNU the ideal nation or an anti-national hub? Considering the power 
that the 9th of Feb incidence had on the institution, JNU’s location on the intersection point 
ultimately revealed its potential for conflict. In the 1970s, the participation of the 
government and the citizens were considered truly “democratic” (CCJNU n.d.). In 2016, the 
question of participation became the lever for change of the institution or its potential 
breaking point. It has turned JNU into a place where choosing site means to choose side 
(Soja 1996, 191) in a long-lasting and enduring battle over Indian forms of nationalism. 
 
6.2 Final remarks: How Looking on nationalism makes a difference 
 
The body of literature on nationalism is immense, and seems to grow every day, which is 
reasonable since “nationalism is too diverse to allow a single theory to explain it all” 
(Calhoun 1997, 123). Justifiably rejecting the political project of naturalizing or 
essentializing the nation, critical public and scientific discourse on nationalism, however, 
often reduces nationalism to groundless propaganda. That perspective then becomes itself 
the political project of debunking the nation as ‘imagined’, thereby locating nationalism in 
an abstract realm somewhere beyond ‘the real’ or ‘truth’. Intellectually drawing a 
hierarchically distinction between the ‘imagined’ and the ‘real’ thus risks overlooking the 
material effects that the construction of nation and nationhood have in our everyday lives. 
While limited in scope, this work aimed to contribute to the debate on nationalism by 
proposing a simultaneous possibility of examining the phenomena of the ‘real’ and the 
‘imagined’. By combining conceptualizations and physical structures, and by analysing their 
practiced correlations or inconsistencies we are able to examine the very concreteness of 
the concepts of nation, nationhood, and nationalism. The work of architects and spatial 
planners, often taken for granted, have always contributed to those negotiations. The 
changing way that space has been imagined, constructed, used, and regulated, offers 
instructive insights into how rights and responsibilities, boundaries and relations, are 
understood within the nation. The texture of the nation, similar to the territory to which it 
is attributed, is never fixed and always under construction. Nevertheless, it has a powerful 
material dimension to it that is locatable. Nationalism affects us not in spite of, but exactly 
because of, its constructedness. 
There are different notions of nation. These notions are in no way arbitrary, but are bound 
to spatial structures, spatial negotiations, and relations. The plurality of powerful 
perspectives and interpretations eventually make places locatable. Because the ‘imagined’ 
and the ‘real’ are inseparable phenomena rather than distinctive entities, the work in hand 
was a more pragmatic and less rational approach. That is to say, its findings do not need to 
remain an experiment of thought. Questioning location by using ‘Where?’ as a relational 
question is an effective tool to track viewing angles and positioning processes. It offers 
perspectives beyond the idealization or demonization of the notions of nation. It makes 
space approachable to empirical work and opens further areas of action. How is space 
arranged to manage and justify demographic divisions? And how can the arrangement of 
buildings contribute to social coexistence? How do spatial designs empower or weaken the 
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value of knowledge? Which role do spatial strategies assume for the allocation of power and, 
in turn, who is afforded the opportunity to participate and appropriate space? With regard 
to the project of finding differentiated and thus socially relevant answers, the look at space 
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